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INTRODUCTION 
 
n November 17, 2008, the Ontario Court of Appeal unanimously 
ruled that agricultural workers in Ontario have a constitutional 
right to bargain collectively with their employers.  This decision 
brought an end to an exclusionary system of labour relations in the Ontario that 
denied substantive rights to some of the province’s most marginalized workers.  
However, like virtually all other legal rulings, it did not come without its 
limitations.   
This paper explores the history of Ontario’s labour laws as they relate to 
agricultural workers, examines the way these laws have been interpreted by the 
judiciary, provides an overview of the most recent case affirming the right of 
agricultural workers to bargain, and analyzes the likely effects of the Court of 
Appeal’s recent decision.  In so doing, it provides commentary on the 
relationship between the labour movement, human rights and the legal system 
more generally, and provides specific commentary on this situation as applies to 
agricultural workers in Ontario. 
This paper is informed largely historical institutionalism, an approach 
which illuminates how political struggle and political actors are influenced by 
institutional settings (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992; Hall and Taylor, 1996).  As such, 
it analyzes various state and societal institutions which shape how political 
actors- in this case the Canadian labour movement- defines their interests and 
structure their power in relation to that of other groups (Thelen and Steinmo, 
1992: 2).  The first part of the analysis begins with an overview of the relationship 
between the Ontario legislature, agricultural workers, and collective bargaining 
rights and highlights the struggles of their reliance on the legislature for 
progressive change.  The second part of the analysis is predominantly legalistic 
and identifies the Charter and the Supreme Court of Canada as central 
institutions within the Canadian polity.  It then examines the relationship 
between the labour movement and these institutions in recent years. An analysis 
O
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of this struggle contains important theoretical implications for the labour 
movement.  This study not only highlights both the uses and limitations to the 
construction of labour rights as human rights, it also forces a re-evaluation of the 
increasingly legalistic strategy employed by the labour movement. 
In recent years, the Canadian labour movement has focused significant 
attention on the constructing labour rights as human rights (D. Fudge, 2006; 
Adams, 2006; NUPGE/UFCW, http://www.labourrights.ca).  The notion of 
labour rights falling under the rubric of human rights builds on the popularity 
and salience of rights discourse in Canada, and is accelerated by decisions in a 
number of Charter challenges.  As a result, the construction of labour rights as 
human rights necessitates that the labour movement should actively embrace the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, International Labour Organization 
(ILO) decrees and accords, and other human rights codes as tools to further the 
rights of working people (Adams, 2008).  At the same time, the labour movement 
has been less reliant on its social democratic allies in the New Democratic Party 
(NDP) and traditional forums such as workplace action and public protests as 
vehicles for social change.  While these strategies remain, to varying degrees, 
viable avenues for the labour movement, rights-discourse and Charter-based 
arguments have become increasingly important.  In short, the Canadian legal 
system, and specifically the Supreme Court of Canada, has been the institution in 
which labour has fought its most important battles in recent years. 
The recent embrace of rights discourse and the Charter by unions in 
Canada is drastically different from the labour movement’s original response to 
the Charter.  Larry Brown, formerly of the Saskatchewan Government and 
General Employees Union (SGEU), aptly summarized the labour movement’s 
historic antipathy toward the court.  He maintained that “working people have 
made their progress in the streets and on picket lines, in meetings and 
demonstrations, in struggle and confrontation…not in the halls of justice” 
(SGEU, 1985: 3).  Indeed, in the early 1980s, the Canadian Labour Congress 
(CLC) and its affiliate unions were noticeably absent from the process of 
patriating Canada’s constitution and establishing the Charter.  While various 
reasons for this absence have been proposed (Mandel, 1994: 261; Weiler, 1986: 
213; Savage, 2007), the labour movement was unwilling to engage itself in 
debates around the Charter. 
The embrace of a legal strategy and a reliance on the Charter to protect 
the rights of workers can be seen through a number of case studies.  One of these 
is the plight of agricultural workers in the province of Ontario.  The struggle of 
workers employed in Ontario’s agricultural industry has been a long one, and 
the union most active in organizing these workers- the UFCW- has increasingly 
constructed labour rights as human rights and relied on the Charter to protect 
and promote the rights of these workers.  In so doing, they have moved beyond a 
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sole reliance on the provincial legislature to foster progressive social and 
economic change. 
 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING RIGHTS, 1943 TO 2002  
 
With increasingly labour militancy on the home front throughout the 
period of the Second World War, the Ontario government introduced the 
Collective Bargaining Act (CBA) in 1943, which provided statutory protections 
and regulations to both organizing and bargaining collectively for the majority of 
private sector workers and many public sector workers in Ontario.  One of the 
exclusions from the CBA, however, was workers employed in the agricultural 
industry.  Following the end the war, the government introduced a more 
comprehensive system of labour law in 1948, known as Labour Relations Act 
(LRA), which, provided basic rights to most private sector trade unions and was 
predicated on the concepts of ‘fairness and balance’ between capital and labour 
(Smith, 2008).  Nevertheless, agricultural workers were barred from organizing 
and could not legally bargain with their employer.   
The exclusion of agricultural workers from the Labour Relations Act was, 
according to the government, fully consistent with its prevailing conception of 
fairness and balance in the field of labour relations.  For example, they argued 
that the exclusion of agricultural workers from the Act was the result of 
agricultural being a seasonal industry with a limited growing season, the 
perishable nature of food products, the added costs that unionization would add 
to the industry, and the dominance of small, family farms within the industry.  
Despite many amendments to the Labour Relations Act throughout the post-war 
era, workers in the agricultural industry were still excluded from organizing and 
bargaining collectively. 
Following the election of the New Democratic Party (NDP) in 1990, the 
new government introduced the Agricultural Labour Relations Act (ALRA) in 
June 1994, which provided agricultural workers with the ability to organize a 
trade union and bargain collectively with their employer (Smith, 2008).  The new 
government argued that this conception of labour relations respected the rights 
of agricultural workers and was sensitive to the nuances of the agricultural 
sector.  Following the passage of the ALRA, the United Food and Commercial 
Workers (UFCW) took the lead in organizing the provinces’ agricultural workers. 
However, any sense of justice for agricultural workers was short lived.  
Following the defeat of the NDP in 1995 and the election of the Progressive 
Conservative Party, Ontario’s system of labour relations underwent a drastic 
change.  Although still premised on achieving a sense of fairness and balance in 
the field of labour relations, the passage of the Labour Relations and 
Employment Statue Law Amendment Act (LRESLAA) in November 1995 
repealed the provisions of the former Agricultural Labour Relations Act and 
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once again excluded those employed in the agricultural industry from 
organizing and bargaining.  Furthermore, the one workplace at which the UFCW 
had won a certification order for under the ALRA was repealed and the two 
other workplaces at which the UFCW had filed certification applications for were 
dismissed.  Within one week of the passage of the LRESLAA and the subsequent 
repeal of the ALRA, the UFCW brought forward a legal challenge against the 
government arguing that the exclusion of agricultural workers from organizing 
and bargaining collectively was a violation of the workers’ freedom of 
association and equality rights under sections 2(d) and 15 of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
Although the lower courts ruled against the UFCW and found the 
government’s legislation to be constitutional, the case was eventually granted 
leave to the Supreme Court of Canada.  The Supreme Court delivered its verdict 
for the case, known as Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), in 2001.  The 
Court found that agricultural worker’s exclusion from the LRA impeded their 
freedom to organize and argued that “legislative protection is absolutely crucial 
if agricultural workers wish to unionize” (Dunmore v. Ontario, para. 42).  The 
Court also recognized the vulnerable position of agricultural workers and the 
power imbalance between managers and marginalized workers, such as those 
employed in agriculture, noting “their political impotence, their lack of resources 
to associate without state protection and their vulnerability to reprisal by 
employers” (Dunmore v. Ontario, para. 41).  Lastly, the Court saw the formal 
exclusion of agricultural workers from the LRA as unconstitutional because it 
“delegitimizes associational activity and thereby ensures it ultimate failure” 
(Dunmore v. Ontario, para. 48). 
The ruling in this case represented an important development in the 
evolution of the meaning of freedom of association rights under section 2(d).  
The Court was explicit on the fact that freedom of association included freedom 
to organize (into a trade union) and that it would be impermissible for the 
legislature to deny this right.  However, despite finding the prohibition on 
organizing to be unconstitutional, the Court’s decision was not without its 
shortcomings.  Despite their noting that “without certain minimum protections, 
the…freedom to organize…would be a hollow freedom,” they dismissed the 
second, and perhaps more important, part of the union’s claim that section 2(d) 
should also consist of the freedom to bargain collectively, effectively hollowing 
out the meaning of the freedom to organize in process (Dunmore v. Ontario, 
para. 42).  Indeed, for a worker looking to join a union, the freedom to organize 
meant little if it did not also encompass an explicit freedom to bargain.  This 
limitation would continue to pose a problem for agricultural workers and is 
illustrative of the shortcomings of legalistic strategy. 
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THE AGRCIULTURAL EMPLOYEES PROTECTION ACT  
 
In response to the Court’s decision in Dunmore, the ironically named 
Agricultural Employees Protection Act (AEPA) was introduced and passed into 
law. However, it is difficult to see how the AEPA purported to protect the rights 
of agricultural workers as the rights it ‘protected’ were already guaranteed 
through other provincial statutes or the Charter.  Of course, the AEPA was fully 
consistent with the Court’s ruling as it allowed agricultural workers to join an 
association, but failed to provide any meaningful protection to bargaining 
collectively.   
The new legislation differed from the normal structure of labour relations 
in the province in a number of ways.  For example, it did not oblige employers to 
bargain in good faith with employee associations.  This regime promoted a 
scheme of voluntarism and was reminiscent, in many respects, of pre-war labour 
relations.  While employees had the opportunity to make submissions to their 
employer, there was no mechanism available to solve ‘bargaining’ impasses.  
Furthermore, if the employer did agree to any of the workers’ demands, there 
was nothing in place to ensure their enforcement.   
This scheme of labour relations also departed significantly from the norm 
of labour relations in the province in that it promoted a concept of non-
majoritarian and non-exclusive representation.  There was no requirement that 
the associations formed under the AEPA would be supported by a majority or 
even a plurality of employees.  Furthermore, the new Act also allowed the 
existence of multiple associations for the same job classification, which promoted 
disunity and divisiveness within the workplace and allowed individual 
employees to ‘bargain’ outside of the association(s) at the workplace.  
Additionally, it provided no financial security to these organizations through 
mandatory dues check off, ensuring that they would be little more than an empty 
shell devoid of the capacities for any real action independent of a reliance on 
income from voluntary donations. 
For agricultural workers seeking meaningful union representation, the 
AEPA offered no hope.  It provided only for the narrowest forms of 
representation and any gains made were based largely on the goodwill of 
employers.  For trade unions seeking to represent these workers, it denied them 
any real criteria to organize workers in a meaningful way.  While associations, 
specifically unions, had constitutional protection of their right exist and organize 
workers, they were still devoid of their main purpose, collective bargaining. 
Although the legislation did not enforce typical standards on majority 
representation, exclusivity, or good faith collective bargaining, it did not 
preclude agricultural employees from becoming members of trade unions or 
from a trade union making representing a group of workers.  Indeed, following 
the passage of the AEPA in 2002, the UFCW continued to have an active presence 
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in the agricultural sector as workers approached the union for some form of 
representation.  At Rol-Land Farms, a mushroom factory in Kingsville, over 70% 
of the workers became members of the UFCW, who eventually filed a 
certification application to represent these workers.  The UFCW also had success 
at organizing workers at Platinum Produce, a greenhouse operation in Chatham.   
Despite the majority of support the UFCW had garnered from the 
workers at Rol-Land, the employer refused to afford voluntary recognition to the 
union as the workers’ bargaining agent, prompting the UFCW to file a formal 
certification vote (which passed 132-45, despite employer intimidation tactics).  
Following the vote, the UFCW sought to meet with management at Rol-Land to 
commence negotiations. Consistent with the legal terms of the AEPA but in 
violation of the democratic will of the workers, Rol-Land refused to negotiate in 
good-faith with the union.  The UFCW received a similar response from 
Platinum Produce after attempting to bargain on behalf of workers there, 
prompting the union to challenge the constitutionality of the AEPA.  This case is 
known as Fraser v. Ontario (Attorney General). 
 
RIGHTS-BASED LITIGATION: THE FRASER DECISION 
 
While the UFCW’s application was originally denied at the Ontario 
Superior Court of Justice, which ruled that the AEPA was consistent with the 
framework established in the Dunmore decision, the legal landscape regarding 
collective bargaining changed considerably shortly thereafter.  In 2007, in the 
case Health Services and Support- Facilities Subsector Bargaining Association v. 
British Columbia, the Supreme Court of Canada determined that “s. 2(d) of the 
Charter protects the capacity of members of labour unions to engage, in 
association, in collective bargaining on fundamental workplace issues” and that 
“if the government substantially interferes with that right, it violates s. 2(d) of the 
Charter” (Health Services, para. 2 and 19).  In short, the Court ruled for the first 
time ever that collective bargaining was a fundamental freedom that 
governments could not deny.  While this case does have its shortcomings, its 
precedent was immediately viewed as having potential ramifications on prima 
facie prohibitions on collective bargaining, specifically Ontario’s ban on 
collective bargaining for agricultural workers.  With a government unwilling to 
change the law (Urquhart, 2007), and a new legal precedent established, the 
UFCW proceeded to appeal the lower court’s decision in Fraser. 
Relying heavily on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Health Services, and, to 
a lesser degree, the ruling in Dunmore, the Ontario Court of Appeal found the 
AEPA to be unconstitutional as it substantially impaired the rights of the 
provinces’ agricultural workers to bargain collectively as the government failed 
to provide requisite statutory protections to ensure that collective bargaining 
could be realized.  In coming to this reasoning, the Court found that: (1) the 
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activity of collective bargaining was, in fact, a valid associational activity; (2) the 
appellants were seeking a positive right to government action (not simply 
freedom from government action); (3) that their claims stemmed from a 
fundamental freedom protected by sec. 2(d); (4) that they demonstrated that their 
exclusions from the statutory regime (a combination of the LRA and the AEPA) 
substantially interfered with their freedom to organize and to bargain; and (5) 
that the government was responsible for the workers’ inability to exercise their 
fundamental freedoms.   
The Court’s previous ruling in Health Services was of considerable 
importance.  Indeed, the passage of the AEPA effectively failed to provide 
sufficient protections to ensure the realization of meaningful collective 
bargaining, frustrated the union and its members in engaging employers in 
good-faith negotiations, and was the result, in part, of state (in)action.  Had it not 
been for clear state (in)action, in this case a prima facie prohibition on 
meaningful collective bargaining, the Court would have rejected the union’s 
claim.   
While the state has become increasingly coercive in regards to workers’ 
rights in the current neo-liberal era (Panitch and Swartz, 2003), many workers’ 
inability to bargain collectively is not linked directly to state (in)action.  This is 
particularly true for those workers lacking a collective agreement in the growing 
low-wage service sector in industries such as retail, hospitality, and food 
services, suggesting that this ruling will have little to no effect on this growing 
and marginalized workforce.  However, as state action was clearly involved in 
this case, the union’s appeal was successful.  Indeed, the Court found that “the 
exclusion of agricultural worker from a collective bargaining regime has a 
chilling effect on their efforts to exercise their right to bargain collectively.  
Accordingly, the inability of agricultural workers to bargain collectively is linked 
to state action” (Fraser v. Ontario, para. 107).  In coming to this conclusion, the 
Court reasoned “that the government has violated [the workers’] s. 2(d) right to 
bargain collectively” Fraser v. Ontario, para. 108). 
Despite this victory for the UFCW and the province’s 100 000 agricultural 
workers, the ruling in Fraser did not come without its limitations.1  In addition 
to arguing that the AEPA violated section 2(d) of the Charter, the UFCW also 
argued that the section 15 equality rights of agricultural workers were being 
violated as the AEPA, in combination with the LRA, denied benefits to 
agricultural workers that were available to other workers in Ontario.  
Specifically, they argued that the status of a being an agricultural worker was 
central to one’s identity and should thus be considered an analogous ground of 
discrimination for the purposes of section 15.   
The Court dismissed this part of the claim, agreeing with the government 
that the distinction of being a worker is not an enumerated or analogous ground 
for discrimination under section 15.  This denial is problematic, despite the final 
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outcome of the case.  The denial of equality rights means that certain types of 
workers can be treated differently from other workers, so long as other Charter 
rights are protected.  This means that in end, while agricultural workers will 
likely be able to bargain collectively, they may be subjected to different rights or 
terms of unionizing and bargaining than other workers in Ontario.  Furthermore, 
by denying employment status as an analogous ground for discrimination, the 
Court has effectively ensured that social or economic class stays out of the 
Charter and constitutionalizes some discrimination against the working class, 
especially its most vulnerable members. 
While agricultural workers have gained the right to bargain collectively 
with employers, they are unlikely to gain the right to strike.  To be sure, in their 
submissions to the Court, the UFCW made it clear that they were not seeking the 
right to strike in their appeal (Fraser v. Ontario, para. 57).  As a result, 
agricultural workers are unlikely to possess the fundamental right to withhold 
their work that many other unionized workers possess.  The Court’s recognition 
of the seasonal nature of farming, the sustainability of family farms, and the 
perishability of food products, though not posing a barrier in this case, is likely to 
prevent agricultural workers from ever gaining the right to strike.  In any event, 
the Court is an institution unlikely to protect or promote the right to strike.  
While the labour movement has made gains under the Charter in recent years, 
the right to strike will be one best protected and promoted by workplace action 
and worker militancy, not legal challenges. 
The Court’s discussion of reasonable limits is another limitation to this 
case specifically, a reliance on the courts more generally, and to the achievement 
of meaningful collective bargaining rights for Ontario’s agricultural workers.  
Indeed, even if a piece of legislation is found to be in violation of the Charter, it 
must pass the ‘Oakes Test’ of reasonable limits under section 1.  The impugned 
legislation can be found constitutional if it represents a pressing and substantial 
objective and the violation of rights is reasonable and demonstrably justified (R. 
v. Oakes, 1986).  In determining the latter, the rights impairment must be 
rationally connected to the purpose, be a minimal impairment, and proportional 
to the objective.  In this case, the Court found the legislation’s stated objective of 
protecting family farms and the production of food to be pressing and 
substantial, but that the prohibition on bargaining was unreasonable. 
However, in finding the AEPA unconstitutional, the Court suspended the 
ruling for twelve months to allow the government to determine the proper way 
to proceed.  The Court also indicated that it would still be possible for the 
government to balance the newly won rights of agricultural workers with the 
AEPA’s stated claim of ensuring the viability of small farms in a manner that 
would withhold future section 1 scrutiny.  The Court noted that “while a line-
drawing process may be difficult, it is not impossible” and provided examples of 
what they deemed to be an appropriate balance (Fraser v. Ontario, para. 134).  
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They noted that in Québec, for example, agricultural workers are able to bargain 
collectively only if the workplace employs at least three workers ordinarily and 
continuously throughout the year, while in farms in New Brunswick with less 
than five employees are exempt from compulsory collective bargaining.  Indeed, 
the Court noted that the problem with the AEPA was not necessarily that it 
limited collective bargaining for agricultural workers in general, but that “it 
exclude[d] all employees in the agricultural sector…” and that “there [was] no 
attempt to minimize the impairment by carving out family farms that are 
allegedly incompatible with a more formal labour relations regime.  Rather, all 
farms, including factory farms, are excluded from collective bargaining” (Fraser 
v. Ontario, para. 132, emphasis in original).   
Thus, the government may pass legislation that decides to draw its 
distinction between family farms and factory farms.  Conversely, it could draw 
the line at ‘x’ number of employees and to prohibit smaller farms from engaging 
in compulsory collective bargaining.  Providing that there is some rationale for 
the selection, it is likely the Court would be differential to the government on 
any future legal challenge.  In the end, it is unlikely that the Fraser decision and 
the government’s response to it will facilitate an environmental that will allow all 
of Ontario’s agricultural workers to enjoy the right to bargain collectively.  
Prohibitions and exclusions from bargaining are likely to continue, albeit in less 
restrictive than the current outright prohibition. 
 
AN EVALUATION OF THE UFCW’S APPROACH TO ORGANIZING 
AGRICULTURAL WORKERS AND A MOVE TOWARD RIGHTS-BASED 
LITIGATION 
 
Although the Fraser ruling is likely to provide agricultural workers’ with 
the opportunity to finally participate in meaningful collective bargaining, it does 
not come without its shortcomings.  In addition to being subject to ‘reasonable 
limits,’ it also falls well short of providing justice to those employed as 
temporary foreign workers.  In Ontario, there are approximately 16 500 
temporary foreign workers employed in the agricultural industry (Lancaster 
House, 2008).  While Justicia for Migrant Workers (J4MW), a Toronto-based 
grassroots organization dedicated to promoting the rights of guest workers 
employed in Canada, applauds the decision in Fraser, they rightly point out that 
“…there is still much to be done to promote migrant farm workers’ human 
rights” (Justicia for Migrant Workers, 2008).  For example, they note migrant 
workers face many barriers upon coming to Canada, including: repatriation 
procedures that are unilateral and provide no appeal mechanism to workers, 
disparities in the health care system which deny equal access, mandatory fees 
and deductions for guest workers, a ban on attending educational institutions 
and problems with agricultural housing facilities, among others.   
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While the ruling in Fraser may provide most agricultural workers, 
including migrant workers, with the right to organize and bargain, it does not 
directly address the other barriers faced by migrant workers.  Indeed, the Court 
is unlikely to provide any sort of justice on these types of barriers, and the onus 
will fall on to the legislature to grant them.  Thus, unions, grassroots 
organizations, and citizens must convince the legislature to enact these changes 
to provide meaningful protection to agricultural workers.  As a result, the labour 
movement must rely on a grassroots political strategy, and not a legalistic one, to 
see these important changes.    
Although the ruling itself illustrates, on some level, that trade unions can 
successfully make rights-based appeals under the legal system, these are by no 
means quick and do not necessarily lead to favourable results.  While the Ontario 
Court of Appeal ruled in the union’s favour, the Ontario government had the 
option to seek leave to the Supreme Court of Canada to have the case heard on 
one final appeal.  This leave was granted in April 2009 (UFCW, 2009).  The 
Ontario government is hoping that the Supreme Court will overturn the Court of 
Appeals’ decision in Fraser and rule that agricultural workers’ exclusion from 
collective bargaining is a reasonable limit.  Although the precedent established in 
Health Services suggests that the government will face an uphill battle in their 
appeal, there remains some chance that the decision will be overturned.  In any 
event, the delay associated with the government’s appeal will have the effect of 
continuing to deny collective bargaining rights to agricultural workers for at 
least a few additional months, and potentially a few additional years. 
Despite the shortcomings to the Fraser decision specifically and a rights-
based strategy more generally, the UFCW’s long struggle to organize Ontario’s 
agricultural workers presents some important lessons for future organizing 
campaigns, and not simply those in the agricultural sector.  For example, the 
UFCW, in conjunction with the Agriculture Workers Alliance, operated eight 
support centres across Canada for agriculture workers throughout the 1990s and 
into the present day, four of which are in Ontario.  This provides the union with 
an opportunity to be in close contact with many of Ontario’s agriculture workers, 
despite not being able to legally bargain on their behalf.  This commitment 
represents an important lesson for other unions attempting to organize new 
workplaces: a union organizing drive should not be abandoned if the union 
cannot get enough cards signed to prompt a vote, nor should it necessarily be 
abandoned following an unsuccessful vote.  Indeed, operating a support centre 
for the targeted workplace can allow the union to offer advice to workers on 
their basic rights and serve as a positive, friendly environment for workers to 
socialize with other union members and their co-workers.   
In addition to agricultural workers, there are other groups of employees 
who are prohibited from bargaining collectively.  In the province of Ontario, this 
would include domestic workers, welfare recipients employed in workfare 
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programs, and school principals and vice-principals.2  A legal challenge may 
afford collective bargaining rights to these workers; however, these exclusions 
may be found to be reasonable limits, and thus be found constitutional.  In any 
event, a legal challenge on behalf of these workers will be a lengthy process and 
success is by no means guaranteed. 
However, the majority of workers who are unable to bargain collectively 
do not face prima facie prohibitions on bargaining collectively, but face practical 
restrictions in which the law fails to promote collective bargaining to their 
industries.  For example, the precarious nature of those employed in ‘non-
standard’ work who are largely unorganized has been well documented (Carre, 
2000; Vosko, 2006).  This includes the growing service industry, including food 
service, hospitality and tourism, and retail.  In these types of industries, the 
precarious and contract nature of employment, the small workplaces, hostile 
employers, a difficult certification procedure, and the hesitancy of unions 
themselves to organize these workers are all factors that explain the relatively 
low level of union density.  An expanded vision of collective bargaining is 
needed to ensure that the right of these workers are protected and enhanced, but 
the Charter will be unable to provide a suitable remedy.   
Despite the ruling in Fraser that workers have a constitutional right to 
bargain collectively, the decision will do precious little for those who want 
organize and bargain collectively and are unable to practically do so, but face no 
legal prohibitions.  Indeed, the only way for these workers to gain the right to 
bargain collectively is for an aggressive organizing strategy by the labour 
movement, and, ideally, the strengthening of labour law by the legislature, such 
as the re-introduction of card-check certification, and legislation to facilitate 
sectoral bargaining.  In any event, the way forward for these workers does not go 
through the Charter or the legal system. 
 
CONCLUSION 
  
The battle to achieve collective bargaining rights for Ontario’s 
agricultural workers has been a long struggle.  Indeed, it took until November 
2008, a full thirteen years after the passage of the Agricultural Employees 
Protection Act, for the unconstitutional law to be struck down.  With an 
upcoming appeal to the Supreme Court, agricultural workers face yet another 
delay in their quest for justice.  The delay associated with the appeals process 
illustrates yet another downfall of a legalistic strategy and is illustrative of the 
lengthy time period that a legalistic strategy can take.  This lengthy period 
represents, in the case of many other workers, the span of three or four contract 
terms.  Although the Court has now ruled that collective bargaining is a 
constitutional right for Ontario’s agricultural workers, the delay has been 
beneficial for farm owners and disastrous for workers.   
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Indeed, the long-term denial of workplace democracy, the substantial amount of 
what could have been negotiated wages and benefits not paid to employees and 
years of legitimate grievances that could not be filed are clearly problematic for 
those employed in the agricultural industry that could have otherwise been 
organized.  Workers who, in 2009, could be building off of their old contracts and 
working toward improved contracts will be sitting down at the bargaining table 
for the first time attempting to secure a first contract.  It is, of course, highly 
unlikely that these newly signed contracts will be backdated to 1995.  In short, 
the denial of bargaining rights since the passage of the AEPA is clearly 
problematic for workers.  At least those employed in the agricultural industry 
can look ahead to the prospects of unionization and meaningful bargaining, that 
is, those whom the government deems able to bargaining under their future 
legislation. 
 
NOTES 
                                                 
1. There has been some discrepancy around exactly how many agricultural workers will be affected by 
this ruling.  The union and some media outlets claim the number to be approximately 100 000.  See, 
for example, United Food and Commercial Workers- Ontario court ruling opens the gate to farm 
rulings, retrieved from: http://www.ufcw.ca/Default.aspx?SectionId=af80f8cf-ddd2-4b12-9f41-
641ea94d4fa4&LanguageId=1&ItemId=de67f14c-925d-4b7c-bf52-accb7a6c2ac8 Nov 27 2008 and Craig 
Pearson, “Court ruing allows farm worker unions,” Windsor Star, Nov 17 2008.  Other media outlets 
and analysts figure this number to be 32 000.  See, for example, Tracey Tyler and Lesley Ciarcula 
Taylor, “Ontario farm workers can unionize,” Toronto Star, 18 November 2008 and Lancaster House- 
Labour Law Online: Recent Decisions retrieved from: 
http://www.lancasterhouse.com/about/headlines_nov26.asp Nov 26 2008.  However, in the same 
article, the Star reports there are 35 000 farming operations in Ontario, which suggests that there 
estimate of the ruling effecting only 32 000 is too low.  The number of workers in the agricultural 
industry employed as temporary guest workers is approximately 16 500. 
2. Another large group of workers who face legal restrictions on their ability to organize are those 
deemed as “self-employed.”  For a detailed understanding of the nature of their work and a critical 
reading of the laws that prevent them from organizing, see Cynthia J. Crawford et. al, Self-Employed 
Workers Organize: Laws, Policy, and Unions (Montréal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
2005).  These workers would also likely benefit from a legal expansion of collective bargaining. 
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